INTRODUCTION
Distributed inference networks (DINs) have attracted much recent attention due to a variety of applications in civilian and military domains. These include surveillance, environment monitoring, cognitive radio networks, and cyber physical systems. DINs employ a group of sensing entities that collaborate to sense and make inferences about a given point of information (POI). In the traditional framework of centralized inference networks, nodes transmit raw observations to the fusion center (FC). These transmissions are not attractive in practice due to their large bandwidth and energy requirements. Therefore, DINs have been proposed, where the nodes transmit compressed observations that are obtained by processing original observations into a finite alphabet set.
In this article, we denote the POI with a variable q ∈ Q, where Q is the set of possible states the phenomenon can take. Consider a distributed network, as shown in Fig. 1 , comprising N sensors and an FC, which makes inferences about the POI. We assume that the ith node makes an observation Y i and compresses it into a symbol v using a quantizer g i . The compressed symbol v i is then transmitted to the FC through a channel, which is represented as a function C F i (·). We denote the received symbols at the FC as u i = C F i (v i ), corresponding to the ith sensor's transmission. The FC uses the fusion rule G FC to integrate the symbols u = {u 1 , …, u N } into a global inference q FC ∈ Q about the unknown phenomenon q.
Although the problem of distributed inference encompasses a broader set of problems, in this article, we focus our attention on two fundamental problems: distributed detection and distributed estimation. The fundamental difference in the two problems lies in the definition of the set Q. In the case of distributed detection, Q = {0, 1}, and in the case of distributed estimation, Q is a continuous set. A practical application of distributed detection is a cognitive radio (CR) network where the secondary users are interested in vacant primary user (PU) channels. On the other hand, examples of distributed estimation include location estimation and surveillance using spatially distributed sensors. Despite their many benefits, the distributed and broadcast nature of the communication links makes DINs susceptible to a breach in confidentiality, which is an important problem especially when the network is a part of a larger cyberphysical system. In a fundamental sense, there are two motives for any eavesdropper (Eve), 1 selfishness and malice, to compromise the confidentiality of a given DIN. For instance, some of the nodes within a CR network may selfishly take advantage of the FC's inferences and may compete against the CR network in using the PU's channels without paying any participation costs to the network moderator. Therefore, in the recent past, there has been a lot of interest in addressing confidentiality in DINs. While our focus in this article is on physical layer secrecy of DINs, it should be mentioned that physical layer secrecy issues have also been considered for other systems such as communication networks [2] .
To set the notations, we represent the channel between the ith sensor and Eve as a function C E i (·). The symbol corresponding to the ith node received at Eve is denoted by w i = C E i (v i ) (Fig.  1) . In other words, the total information leakage is a function of w = {w 1 , … , w N }. Similar to the FC, we assume that Eve uses a decision rule G E to integrate the symbols w into its own global inference q E . Several metrics have been proposed in the literature to quantify secrecy or the information leakage to Eve. Some of them include equivocation, Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) , Fisher Information (FI), and probability of error (P E ). Ideally, the goal is to minimize this information leakage to the maximum extent possible. For example, if KLD or conditional FI is the chosen metric, perfect secre-
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cy is achieved when KLD or conditional FI at Eve becomes zero.
In this article, we survey the state-of-the-art approaches proposed to address secrecy in the context of DINs. We first introduce a taxonomy where we present a survey of the state of the art on secrecy in DINs. Then we specifically focus on distributed detection and estimation frameworks, respectively, where we present a detailed account of how secrecy is addressed in each of these frameworks. Finally, we present some important open problems while designing a secure DIN in the presence of eavesdroppers.
APPROACHES TO MITIGATE THREATS ON CONFIDENTIALITY
There are fundamentally four approaches to address secrecy in the context of DINs, which we discuss next.
DESIGN OF SENSOR QUANTIZERS AND FUSION RULE
In this approach, the network designer takes advantage of the difference in the channels (C F i , C E i ), for all i = 1, … , N, while designing sensor quantizers and the fusion rule. We denote by g = {g 1 , … , g N } the vector of all sensor quantizers in the DIN. We assume that the quantizer g i at the ith sensor lies within the set R i , i = 1, … , N. Similarly, we denote the set of decision rules at the FC and Eve as R FC and R E , respectively.
Without loss of generality, we denote the performance metric at the FC and Eve as  FC and  E , respectively. Consider a scenario where the network has a tolerable upper bound on the amount of information leaked to Eve. Mathematically, this can be quantified in terms of a constraint a on Eve's performance metric  E . Then one approach for distributed inference system design is below. • Quantizers satisfy g i OE R i , "i = 1, … , N.
• Fusion rule at the FC satisfies G FC ∈ R FC .
Note that error exponents are asymptotic performance metrics at the FC and Eve that represent exponential decay rates of P E of their respective "optimal" detectors. Therefore, if the performance metric chosen is an error-exponent such as KLD (for Neyman-Pearson detection setup) or Chernoff Information (for Bayesian detection setup), Problem 1 becomes independent of the fusion rules G FC and G E at the FC and Eve, respectively, and reduces to the design of sensor quantizers alone.
STOCHASTIC ENCRYPTION
Through another approach where the network is designed within the tolerable bounds on information leakage to Eve, one can pursue a more active approach where the sensors flip their decisions randomly in order to confuse Eve. In this case, the FC is assumed to have better knowledge about the sensors than Eve, since the FC either deterministically knows the flipping sensors or has knowledge about the flipping probability, about which Eve is completely ignorant. This introduces a significant difference in the channels (C F i , C E i ), i = 1, … , N, thus reducing the information leakage to Eve.
Let the alphabet set of the compressed symbols v i at the ith sensor be denoted as A, where the size of A is denoted by M. In other words, the ith sensor employs an M-ary quantizer to compress the observation Y i into one of the M symbols. Let us denote the flipping probability matrices as P = {P 1 , … , P N }, where P i denotes the flipping probability matrix at the ith sensor, which can be interpreted as pre-shared keys between the nodes and the FC. Note that P i is a stochastic matrix for any i = 1, … , N, since all of its row elements sum up to unity. The basic problem in this case can be stated as below.
Problem 2:
Find P = {P 1 , … , P N } such that  FC is maximized while satisfying the constraints:
• P i is a row-stochastic matrix, for all i = 1, … , N.
Note that several variants of this problem can be investigated depending on the amount of knowledge the FC has regarding the stochastic encryption process. For example, one may consider that the FC has complete knowledge about the flipping probability matrices P, but does not know exactly whether or not the sensor messages are flipped. In this case, the FC can improve the secrecy performance at the expense of detection performance. On the other hand, the ideal scenario is the case where the FC acquires exact instantaneous knowledge regarding which sensor messages are flipped. This can be done by spending energy in the mechanism that facilitates communication between the FC and the flipping sensors. 
ARTIFICIAL NOISE INJECTION
Another approach, similar to the case of stochastic encryption, is the addition of artificial noise to sensor transmissions. Note that both stochastic encryption and the addition of artificial noise to sensor transmissions are data falsification schemes that are employed to confuse Eve. In this article, we denote the artificial noise added to the ith sensor's transmissions as h i . Then the ith sensor transmits x i to the FC and Eve, where
} denote the set of artificial noise distributions employed by all the sensors in the network. Then the problem can be stated as follows.
is maximized while satisfying the constraints:
MIMO BEAMFORMING
In order to ensure minimal performance loss at the FC as a trade-off to attaining the secrecy constraint at Eve, another alternative approach is to use multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) beamforming, where the sensor messages are directed toward the FC. In this case, we assume that the sensors are equipped with multiple antennas to transmit their messages to the FC. The beamforming mechanism is designed in such a way that some of the available energy is invested in the beams directed toward the FC, while the nulls are directed toward Eve. We denote the number of antennas at the ith sensor as L i . Therefore, the ith sensor constructs a vector x i based on the symbol v i and transmits it to the FC and Eve, respectively. Based on the channel gains at the FC and Eve, this x i is designed to appear very noisy at Eve, and simultaneously have significant information about the compressed symbol v i at the FC. For example, let x i be constructed as x i = b i v i , where b i is the beamforming gain vector of the ith sensor's signal. Assuming that both the FC and Eve have only a single antenna, the resulting received symbols at the FC and Eve are given by u i and w i , respectively. Let n FC i and n E i denote the noise at the FC and Eve, respectively. Then
Since all practical sensors are energy-constrained, we assume that the total energy available at the ith sensor is denoted by E i . Then the design problem can be formally stated as follows.
• b i is chosen such that the total transmit energy is within the prescribed limit E i for all i = 1, … , N. In general, it is assumed that the FC is more powerful than the sensors in terms of available resources (e.g., hardware/software and available energy). Also, all of the above approaches can be combined together to design a system in a holistic manner and attain better performance in terms of  FC , given a tolerable Eve's constraint a.
SECRECY IN DISTRIBUTED DETECTION
In this section, we provide a survey on how secrecy is addressed within the framework of classical and compressive detection networks respectively. In both these frameworks, we organize the survey according to the four different approaches listed previously.
CLASSICAL DISTRIBUTED DETECTION
First, we consider the first approach, where the distributed detection network (i.e., sensor quantizers and fusion rule) is optimized while satisfying the secrecy constraints at Eve. Nadendla et al. made the first attempt in 2010 in [3] , where they considered an unconstrained differential secrecy problem. Let us denote KLDs at the FC and Eve by D FC and D E , respectively. Problem 1 in their setup reduces to the design of sensor quantizers alone, with  FC = D FC -D E and a = •. It was assumed that the channel state information (CSI) is completely known at both the FC and Eve. The authors showed that in the case of an eavesdropper with noisier channels, the optimal local detectors are always on the boundaries of the achievable region of a sensor's ROC and therefore are likelihood-ratio tests (LRTs). The authors also considered Problem 1 with  FC = D FC and  E = D E , in which case the structure of an optimal local detector was conjectured to be an LRT-based test based on numerical results.
In 2009, Marano et al. [4] considered the problem of designing optimal decision rules for a sensor network where the sensors perform censoring in order to save energy. It was assumed that the eavesdropper does not have access to the sensors' transmitted data, but can monitor the transmission activity of the channel and exploit the busy/idle state of the channel to detect the hypothesis. KLD was used as the performance metric for both the FC and Eve, and a censoring strategy was developed in order to maximize the KLD of FC while ensuring that the KLD of Eve was zero (perfect secrecy). Although their framework of censoring sensor networks is more general, they assumed that Eve can only determine whether or not an individual sensor transmits its decision. In reality, Eve can extract more information than merely determining the presence or absence of transmission, and hence can make a reasonably good decision based on its reception.
Li et al. investigated the problem of Bayesian distributed detection in 2014 with two nodes in the network in the presence of an eavesdropper [5] , where Eve has access to only one of the sensor's transmissions. Here,  FC and Ω E were assumed to be negative expected detection costs at the FC and Eve, respectively. The authors proved that LRT-based tests were optimal at the sensors if the network is designed to minimize the expected detection cost at the FC such that the minimum average cost at Eve is no greater than a prescribed non-negative value a.
Li et al. [6] also investigated the detection problem under the Neyman-Pearson setup for the same network as in [5] . The sensor quantizers and the fusion rule were designed to maximize the FC's probability of detection ( FC ) in the presence of constraints on false alarm probabilities at the FC and Eve, along with the probability of detection at Eve ( E ). Note that the false alarm constraints at both the FC and Eve are captured by the feasibility sets R FC and R E , respectively. Here, the authors proved that the optimal local quantizer is a deterministic LRT, while the fusion rule may still be a randomization between two or more LRTs. Later, in 2014, Nadendla et al. [7] investigated a more general framework in with N sensors. They proved the conjecture in [3] in the context of binary symmetric channels 2 (BSCs) between the sensors, FC, and Eve. An algorithm was also presented to find optimal thresholds for the likelihood ratio quantizers when the sensor observations are corrupted by additive Gaussian noise. Figure 2 depicts the FC's performance in terms of both probability of detection (P D ) and KLD at the FC as a function of false alarm probability (P F ) in the presence of tolerable limits on Eve's KLD. Note that the optimal quantizer is always on the intersection of the ROC and Eve's constraint curve. The authors also showed that the network with non-identical sensors and channels can be designed by solving N sequential problems, where the order of this sequence is dictated by the quality of the corresponding sensor's channel. Next, we survey the literature that addresses the second mitigation approach, where a stochastic cipher is employed to confuse Eve regarding the true phenomenon. Soosahabi et al. [8] employ J-divergence as the performance metric for both the FC and Eve and design a network that guarantees perfect secrecy. This is achieved by fixing a = 0 in Problem 2. Probabilistic ciphers were also studied in [9] , where the performance metric chosen was the error probability in the case of both FC and Eve. Note that both [8, 9] assume the existence of an underlying key exchange mechanism that is secure from Eve. Alternatively, channel-aware stochastic ciphers use seeds that are obtained by exploiting randomness in the channel-gains between the node and the FC. For example, Jeon et al. [10] proposed a type-based multiple access (TBMA) protocol for a distributed detection network with a multiple access channel (MAC). Here, some of the nodes in the network are selected to deliberately transmit interfering signals so as to minimize degradation in the FC's detection performance, while simultaneously preventing Eve from identifying the sensors generating interference. Note that the above scheme requires full CSI at the sensors, and therefore may be impractical in some scenarios. In order to alleviate this problem, efforts such as [11] have been made in the literature, where Jeon et al. designed a secure transmission strategy for the local nodes in a parallel distributed detection network, in which the FC first broadcasts known symbols and two thresholds to let the nodes measure their channel condition. Depending on the received symbols, the nodes are divided into three groups, non-flipping, flipping, and dormant. The non-flipping set of sensors quantize the sensed data and transmit them to the FC, while the flipping sensors transmit flipped decisions in order to confuse Eve. The sensors within the dormant set sleep in order to conserve energy and have an energy-efficient sensor network with longer lifetime.
Finally, there have been efforts to design a hybrid mitigation approach that combines the effects of both the first and second approaches. In this regard, Nadendla [12] considered the problem of Bayesian distributed detection in the presence of an eavesdropper, where the nodes use identical threshold quantizers to make their binary decisions and encrypt them before transmission using a simple probabilistic cipher. Cipher parameters and threshold were optimized jointly so as to ensure an acceptable probability of error at the FC while maximizing the probability of error at Eve. 
COLLABORATIVE COMPRESSED DETECTION
In scenarios where the POI is a high dimensional signal vector, the collaborative compressed detection (CCD) framework has been proposed. In contrast to the conventional detection framework, in CCD, the detection problem is solved directly in the compressive measurement domain. More specifically, the CCD framework comprises a group of spatially distributed nodes that require observations regarding the high-dimensional (K × 1) signal vector to be detected. Nodes compress their observations using a M × K low-dimensional (M < < K) random projection operator f. Each node i sends an unquantized (or quantized) version of compressed observation vector Y i to the FC, where a global decision is made.
First, we focus our attention on the first approach, where nodes do not quantize their observations, and the FC receives compressed observation vectors, Y = [Y 1 , … , Y N ]. Kailkhura et al. [13] considered the problem of collaborative signal vector detection using unquantized compressive measurements under a physical layer secrecy constraint  E £ a. To counter Eve, the authors considered a variant of the third mitigation approach by proposing to use b fraction of cooperative nodes that assist the FC by injecting artificial noise (adding or subtracting a constant vector D i from their observation vector Y i ) in the system to confuse the eavesdroppers. The authors employed deflection coefficient d i as the performance metric for both the FC and Eve; thus,  FC = d FC , and  E = d E . The problem of determining optimal system parameters (i.e., compression ratio c and noise injection parameters (b, D i )) that maximize d FC while ensuring perfect secrecy at the eavesdropper (information of the eavesdropper is exactly zero, that is, a = 0) was also considered.
Kailkhura et al. [14] extended the CCD framework to the case where compressive measurements were quantized to one bit using the LRT. The performance metric was assumed to be P E . The authors considered a hybrid mitigation approach that combines the features of both the second and third mitigation approaches. They proposed to use B out of N cooperating trustworthy nodes that assist the FC by providing flipped decisions (stochastic enciphering with for all i = 1, … , B) to Eve to achieve perfect secrecy. The authors considered the problem of designing optimal system parameters (fusion rule, compression ratio c, and fraction of data falsifying nodes b = B/N) such that P E at the FC is minimized while ensuring perfect secrecy. In Fig. 3 , the minimum P E (over all the fusion rules), at both the FC and the eavesdropper, is plotted as a function of c for the equal prior case. It can be seen from Fig. 3 that the detection performance, at both the FC and the eavesdropper, is a monotonically increasing function of c; that is, detection performance is better with less compression. This suggests that compression improves security performance at the expense of detection performance.
SECRECY IN DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION
In this section, we survey the state of the art on how breaches in confidentiality are mitigated in distributed estimation networks. First, we survey the fourth mitigation approach in the context of distributed estimation networks. For example, Guo et al. [15] considered the problem of estimating a single point Gaussian source in the presence of Eve, where the sensor observations are transmitted using an amplify-and-forward technique over a slow-fading orthogonal MAC. Two different scenarios were addressed within this framework: one where there are multiple Figure 4 . Performance comparison between full CSI, partial CSI and artificial noise in a multiple-antenna system [15] . nodes, with each node having a single transmit antenna, and another where a single node has multiple antennas. Through appropriate power allocation at the sensors, the network is designed to achieve the minimum mean square error (MSE) regarding the POI in each of the above mentioned scenarios while guaranteeing MSE at Eve to be greater than a threshold a. As shown in Fig. 4 , the authors plot the distortion (MSE) performance at the FC with respect to the security threshold a = D min , for a one-antenna case and a three-antenna case, respectively. For comparison, the system performance is depicted under four settings, namely partial CSI, full CSI, full CSI with perfect secrecy, and partial CSI with artificial noise. First, due to the channel knowledge of both the FC and Eve, it is not surprising to see that the performance of full CSI is superior to the performance of partial CSI, and the gap keeps increasing as we increase the secrecy threshold. Another important observation is the small gap between the MSE in the perfect secrecy setting and the MSE in the setting with artificial noise. Similar performance was also obtained for the multiple nodes network, where each node has only one transmit antenna. Next, we survey how stochastic encryption is used as a mitigation scheme in distributed estimation networks. Aysal et al. [16] considered the problem of distributed estimation of a deterministic signal in the presence of an Eve, where each node collects a noisy observation, performs binary quantization, and transmits the 1-bit decision to the FC. The authors assume that both the FC and Eve pursue maximum likelihood estimation in the presence of a stochastic cipher, for which bias, variance, and MSE were derived in closed form. In the context of symmetric ciphers, where for all i = 1, … , N, the behavior of Eve's bias and MSE and FC's Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB) are characterized in Fig. 5 . Note that as p AE 0, Eve's bias increases, Eve's MSE increases, and the CRLB decreases. On the other hand, as p tends to unity, Eve's bias decreases, Eve's MSE decreases, and the CRLB decreases. In other words, choosing a smaller p is better as it results in a significant amount of bias and MSE at Eve, with a marginal increase in the estimation variance at the FC. In the case where for all i = 1, … , N with p 0 π p 1 , the effect of varying p 0 and p 1 on the FC's CRLB, Eve's bias, and Eve's MSE are summarized in Fig. 6 . In their numerical results, the authors also demonstrated that asymmetric ciphers (i.e., ciphers with asymmetric flipping probability matrices) produce greater bias and MSE than the symmetric ciphers.
SUMMARY AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Despite the increasing attention on secure distributed inference in the presence of eavesdroppers, research in this area is still at an early stage. So far, four different approaches have been proposed to mitigate breaches in confidentiality in the context of DINs. However, all of these four approaches rely on an important underlying assumption: that Eve's channels C E i , for all i = 1, … , N, are completely known at the FC, which may not be true in practice. In fact, there is no work in the context of inference networks on how one can acquire the information about a passive Eve's channel. This is a hard problem to solve because there is no feedback from Eve to any of the nodes in the network regarding its presence or activity. An alternative to this roadblock is to assume that Eve's channel belongs to a set C, and investigate the best and worst case performance at Eve over a class C. Information regarding this set C can be obtained from the scene where the network is deployed.
Also, the designers may extend the aforementioned four fundamentally different approaches into several hybrid approaches by considering two or more of these approaches together to create a more sophisticated and improved system in terms of FC performance for a given tolerable constraint on Eve. Although there have been a few attempts in this direction, one can still envision many such hybrid mechanisms where the designer may accumulate the benefits of each of these approaches. For example, including an energy consumption constraint for secure system design is an important open problem. Of course, there is always a need for new approaches that are fundamentally different from any of the four approaches listed in this article. Recently, other architectures such as tree, tandem, and flat (without the FC) have attracted much interest due to their practical significance. These architectures pose serious issues in terms of secrecy and secure communications. Studying the secrecy performance of such systems in the context of distributed inference is worth exploring in the future. 
